ABSTRACT: This paper analyzes monotone comparative statics predictions in several classes of stochastic optimization problems. The main results characterize necessary and sufficient conditions for comparative statics predictions to hold based on properties of primitive functions, that is, utility functions and probability distributions. The results apply when the primitives satisfy one of the following two properties: (i) a single crossing property, which arises in applications such as portfolio investment problems and auctions, or (ii) log-supermodularity, which arises in the analysis of demand functions, affiliated random variables, stochastic orders, and orders over risk aversion.
Introduction
Since Samuelson, economists have studied and applied systematic tools for deriving comparative statics predictions. Recently, the theory of comparative statics has received renewed attention (Topkis (1978) , Milgrom and Roberts (1990a , 1990b , Milgrom and Shannon (1994) , Vives (1990) ). The new literature provides general and widely applicable theorems about comparative statics, and further, it emphasizes the robustness of conclusions to changes in the specification of models. The literature shows that many of the robust comparative statics results that arise in economic theory rely on three main properties: supermodularity, log-supermodularity, and single crossing properties. 1
This paper characterizes log-supermodularity and single crossing properties in stochastic problems, establishing necessary and sufficient conditions for comparative statics predictions. 2 More precisely, let u be an agent's payoff function, let f be a probability density function, and let the agent's objective function be given by U(x,θ) = Õu(x,s)f(s,θ)ds, where x represents a choice vector and θ represents an exogenous parameter. The comparative statics question concerns conditions on primitives-the payoff function and probability density-under which the agent's optimal choice of x is nondecreasing in θ.
We begin with families of problems where one of the primitive functions is log-supermodular (abbreviated log-spm). For example, an agent's marginal utility u′(w+s) is log-spm in (w,s) if the utility function satisfies decreasing absolute risk aversion; a parameterized demand function D(p;ε) is log-spm if demand becomes less elastic as ε increases; a set of random variables is affiliated 3 if the joint density is log-spm; and a parameterized density of a single random variable, f(s;θ), is log-spm if the parameter shifts the distribution according to the monotone likelihood ratio property.
Our first result establishes that the agent's choice of x is nondecreasing in θ for all utility functions u that are log-spm, if and only if f is log-spm. One application considers a pricing game between firms with private information about their marginal costs; we provide conditions under which each firm's price increases in its marginal cost (and thus, a pure strategy Nash equilibrium exists). More generally, we show that U is log-spm for all u that are log-spm, if and only if f is log-spm. The characterizations of log-spm are used to establish relationships between several 1 A function on a product set is supermodular if increasing any one variable increases the returns to increasing each of the other variables; for differentiable functions this corresponds to non-negative cross-partial derivatives between each pair of variables. A positive function is log-supermodular if the log of that function is supermodular. 2 Vives (1990) and Athey (1998) study supermodularity in stochastic problems. Vives (1990) shows that supermodularity is preserved by integration. Athey (1998) allows for payoff functions that satisfy properties which are preserved by convex combinations (including supermodularity, monotonicity and concavity). Independently, Gollier and Kimball (1995a, b) used convex analysis to analyze comparative statics of investment problems. The properties studied in this paper are not preserved by convex combinations, and so different techniques are used. 3 A vector of random variables is affiliated if every nondecreasing function of the vector is positively correlated.
The Comparative Statics Problem
We begin with some notation. Let Θ ⊆ , let In order to make (MCS) precise, we need to specify in what sense x * should be nondecreasing,
as well as what it means for the constraint set B to increase. To do so, we introduce some notation from lattice theory. Given a set X and a partial order ≥, the operations "meet" (∨) and 4 Karlin and Rubin (1956) studied the preservation of single crossing properties under integration with respect to logspm densities. A number of papers in the statistics literature have exploited this relationship, and Karlin's (1968) monograph presents the general theory of the preservation of an arbitrary number of sign changes under integration. Jewitt (1987) exploits the work on the preservation of single crossing properties and bivariate log-spm in his analysis of orderings over risk aversion and associate comparative statics; he makes use of the fact that orderings over risk aversion can be recast as statements about log-spm of a marginal utility. 5 Many authors have studied the comparative statics properties of portfolio and investment problems, including Diamond and Stiglitz (1974) , Eeckhoudt and Gollier (1995) , Gollier (1995) , Hadar and Russell (1978) , Jewitt (1986 Jewitt ( , 1987 Jewitt ( , 1988b Jewitt ( , 1989 , Kimball (1990 Kimball ( , 1993 , Landsberger and Meilijson (1990) , Meyer and Ormiston (1983 , 1985 , 1989 , Ormiston (1992) , and Ormiston and Schlee (1992, 1993) ; see Scarsini (1994) for a survey of the main results involving risk and risk aversion. 6 Nothing would change in the paper if we let X be an arbitrary lattice; we use n X ⊆ for simplicity.
7 More generally, whenever integrals appear, we assume that requirements of integrability and measurability are met.
"join" (∧) are defined as follows: x y zz x z y ∨ = ≥ ≥ inf , < A and x y zz x z y ∧ = ≤ ≤ sup , < A . For n with the usual order, these represent the component-wise maximum and component-wise minimum, respectively. A lattice is a set X together with a partial order, such that the set is closed under meet and join.
These definitions can be used to define the order over sets used in (MCS). 
Definition 1 A set A is greater than a set B in the
If a set-valued function is nondecreasing in the strong set order, then the lowest and highest elements of this set are nondecreasing. For example, a set of the form [ , ] [ , ] a b a b
We assume throughout that the constraint set B is a sublattice, so that it is closed under the meet and join operations. Thus, if one component of x increases, the constraint set does not force other components of x to decrease. Then, Milgrom and Shannon (1994) show that (MCS) holds if and only if U is quasi-supermodular (abbreviated quasi-spm) in x and satisfies a single crossing property, referred to as SC2, in (x;θ). 8 These properties are defined as follows: The definition of SC1 simply says that as t increases, g(t) crosses zero at most once and from below. Single crossing in two variables, SC2, in (x;t) requires that the incremental returns to x satisfy SC1. When U satisfies SC2 in (x;θ), as θ increases, an agent choosing between L x and H x will first prefer L x , then become indifferent, and finally prefer H x . For establishing (MCS), the additional requirement that U is quasi-spm ensures that increases in the components of x reinforce one another.
Log-Spm Primitives
To understand when primitive functions might be log-spm, consider first the formal definition. 10
8 Since an empty set is always larger and smaller than any other set in the strong set order, we do not state an assumption about the existence of an optimum (following Milgrom and Shannon (1994) ). 9 This definition applies because we assumed that X is a product set. When X is an arbitrary lattice, h is quasisupermodular if for all x, y X ∈ , ( ) (
≥ > x y y . 10 Karlin and Rinott (1980) referred to log-spm as multivariate total positivity of order 2. Topkis (1978) proves that if h is twice differentiable, h is supermodular if and only if
then h is log-spm if and only if log(h(x)) is supermodular. Both properties are stronger than quasi-supermodularity; thus, as properties of objective functions, both are sufficient for comparative statics predictions to hold. Observe that sums of supermodular functions are supermodular, and products of log-spm functions are log-spm. However, sums of log-spm functions are not necessarily log-spm.
Consider some examples where economic primitives are log-spm. A parameterized demand function D(P;t) is log-spm if and only if the price elasticity, ( ; ) ( ; ) ( ; ) 
Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Comparative Statics
Our first step in analyzing (MCS) for problems with log-spm primitives follows.
Lemma 1 Suppose f is non-negative. Then (i) (MCS) holds for all
Lemma 1 states that if we want (MCS) to hold for all log-spm payoffs, the objective function 11 Although supermodularity can be checked pairwise (see Topkis, 1978) , Lorentz (1953) and Perlman and Olkin (1980) establish that the pairwise characterization of log-spm requires additional assumptions, such as strict positivity (at least throughout "order intervals"). 12 The MLR can also be defined for distributions with varying supports, or distributions that do not have densities with respect to Lebesgue measure; see the Appendix for details. 13 See Lehmann (1955) and Milgrom (1981) . Related, in the statistics literature (Karlin, 1968) , a strictly positive bivariate function satisfies total positivity of order 2 (TP-2) if and only if it is log-spm.
U must be log-spm (a stronger condition than quasi-spm). The proof shows that if U fails to be log-spm in (x,θ) for some u log-spm, then we can find another log-spm payoff, v, for which (MCS) fails (in particular, we show that ( , ) ( ; ) ( ) v f d θ µ ∫ x s s s fails to be quasi-spm in x or to be SC2 in (x;θ)). Lemma 1 then motivates the main technical question for this section: under what conditions on f does log-supermodularity of u imply that U is log-spm? Consider a result from the statistics literature, which will be one of the main tools used in this paper.
Lemma 2 (Ahlswede and Daykin, 1979) Let h i (i=1, ..., 4) 
I
is log-spm in y. Recall that arbitrary sums of log-spm functions are not logspm, which makes this result somewhat surprising. But notice that Lemma 2 does not apply to arbitrary sums, only to sums of the form g(y,s 1 ) + g(y,s 2 ), when g is log-spm in all arguments.
The preservation of log-spm under integration is especially useful for analyzing expected values of payoff functions. Since arbitrary products of log-spm functions are log-spm, a sufficient condition for ( , ) ( ; ) ( ) u f d θ µ ∫ x s s s to be log-spm is that u and f are log-spm. To understand the intuition, consider first the case where , X S ⊆ . Then, u is log-spm implies that the relative returns to x are nondecreasing in s. If f is log-spm, then θ increases the likelihood of high values of s relative to low values of s. Then, Lemma 2 implies that θ increases the expected relative returns to x. In the multivariate case, log-spm of u and f ensure that the interactions among components of x and s reinforce these effects. Karlin and Rinott give many examples of densities that are log-spm, and thus preserve log-spm of a payoff function. 15 Below, in Section 2.4.1, we 14 This result has a long history in statistics. Lehmann (1955) proved that bivariate log-supermodularity is preserved by integration. Ahlswede and Daykin (1979) extended the theory to multivariate functions. Karlin and Rinott (1980) present the theory of multivariate total positivity of order 2 (MTP-2) functions together with a variety of useful applications, though comparative statics results are not among them. Milgrom and Weber (1982) independently derived a variety of properties of affiliated random variables in auctions. See also Whitt (1982) . 15 For example, exchangeable, positively correlated normal vectors and absolute values of normal random vectors have log-supermodular densities (but arbitrary positively correlated normal random vectors do not; Karlin and Rinott (1980) give restrictions on the covariance matrix which suffice); and multivariate logistic, F, and gamma distributions show how the result can be used in analyzing the preservation of ratio orderings, such as decreasing absolute risk aversion.
An especially important type of log-spm function for our purposes is an indicator function for a sublattice or a nondecreasing set-valued function. In a similar way, Lemma 3 can also be used to show that log-spm of f is a necessary condition for U to be log-spm whenever u is log-spm. Lemma 3 helps us identify a set of "test functions"
that are a subset of the set of log-spm functions; these are the functions used to create counterexamples. Consider the special case where X=S.
Because for each x and ε, B ε (x) is a sublattice and is nondecreasing in x in the strong set order, Lemma 3 implies that ( ) ( ) is a subset of log-spm functions, but the set is large enough to make log-spm of f a necessary condition for U to be log-spm. 18 The following result generalizes this discussion.
have log-supermodular densities. 16 See Eeckhoudt and Gollier (1995) , who show that an MPR shift is sufficient for a risk-averse investor to increase his portfolio allocation. 17 We say that f is log-spm a.e.-µ if the inequality in Definition 3 holds for almost all (w.r.t. the product measure on
18 Our approach to necessity can be understood with reference to the stochastic dominance literature, and more generally Athey (1998) . Athey (1998) shows that in stochastic problems, if one wishes to establishes that a property P holds for U(x,θ) for all u in a given class &, it is often necessary and sufficient to check that P holds for all u in the set of extreme points of &. The extreme points can be thought of as test functions; for example, when & is the set of nondecreasing functions, the set of test functions is the set of indicator functions for sets ( ) A 1 s that are nondecreasing in s. Athey (1998) shows that this approach works well when P is a property preserved by convex combinations, unlike log-supermodularity.
Lemma 4 Suppose f is nonnegative, and that n ≥2 if m≥ 2 (where m is the dimension of S and n is the dimension of X). The following two conditions are equivalent: (i) U is log-spm in
(x,θ) for all : u X S + × → that are log-spm a.e.-µ; (ii) f is log-spm in (s;θ) a.e.-µ.
Remark Lemma 4 requires that x has at least two components (n≥2) if s has two or more components (m≥2). 19 However, even in cases where m≥2 and n=1, (ii) is sufficient for (i), and further, log-supermodularity of f in ( , ) i s θ is necessary for (i) to hold.
Lemma 4 is of interest in its own right, as we will see below. For the moment, however, we use Lemma 4 (together with Lemma 1) to prove our first comparative statics theorem.
Theorem 1 (Comparative Statics with Log-Supermodular Primitives) Suppose f is nonnegative, and suppose n ≥2 if m≥ 2 (where m is the dimension of S and n is the dimension of X). The following two conditions are equivalent: (i) (MCS) holds for all
Theorem 1 gives necessary and sufficient conditions for comparative statics when the payoff function is log-spm. Further, the approach based on test functions allows the modeler to immediately check whether any additional restrictions on the class of admissible payoff functions (where such restrictions might be motivated by an economic model) affect the necessity conclusion. For example, the elements of 7(β) are clearly not monotonic, and thus the "only if"
part of Theorem 1 does not hold under the additional assumption that u is nondecreasing. In contrast, we can approximate the elements of 7(β) with smooth functions, so smoothness restrictions will not alter the conclusion of Theorem 1.
Finally, we observe that the results of Lemmas 2 and 3 can be combined to provide sufficient conditions for comparative statics in problems outside the particular structure considered in (MCS). For example, suppose that for j=1,..,J, : 2
is a sublattice and is nondecreasing in τ j , and let A( ) ( ) ,..,
is nondecreasing in all of its arguments. However, note that even if h is a probability density, the objective function in this problem cannot be interpreted as a conditional expectation of g, since we have not divided by the probability that ( ) A ∈ s τ . The working paper (Athey, 1997) uses Lemmas 2 and 3 to provide necessary and sufficient conditions for comparative statics predictions to hold when the objective function is a conditional expectation.
Applications

Risk Aversion and Background Risks
Lemma 4 can be applied to problems that involve orderings of ratios. For example, consider 19 If we extend the analysis so that X is an arbitrary lattice rather than a product set, we require that X has at least two elements that are not ordered.
g, h:
Now observe that if h>0, u is log-spm if and only if g(s)/h(s) is nondecreasing in s. Using this construction, Lemma 4 implies that ( ) ( ; ) ( ) ( ; ) g s f s ds h s f s ds
θ θ ∫ ∫ is nondecreasing in θ for all g, h: 
MLR Shifts and Decreasing Absolute Risk Aversion If R(w;u(⋅;γ)) is nonincreasing in w
and f is log-spm in (s,θ), then R(w;U(⋅;γ,θ)) is nonincreasing in θ. R(w;u(⋅;γ) ) is nonincreasing in w and γ, then R(w;U(⋅;γ,θ)) is nonincreasing in w and γ.
Preservation of Decreasing Absolute Risk Aversion Under Background Risks If
Prudence
Results (1) and (2) hold for a risk-averse agent when R(w;u) is replaced by
More generally, Lemma 4 establishes that risk aversion orderings are preserved in the presence of multiple, affiliated background risks:
4. Affiliated Background Risks Let z be the "primary" risk, and suppose that the agent has a positive position (with portfolio weights α) in a vector of assets with conditional density
is log-spm (the risks are affiliated) and R (w;u(⋅;γ) ) is nonincreasing in w and γ, then R(z;U(⋅;w,γ)) is nonincreasing in z, w and γ. 21
Log-Spm Games of Incomplete Information
Consider a game of incomplete information where each player has private information about her own type, i i t T ∈ ⊆ , and chooses a strategy : Athey (forthcoming) shows that a pure strategy Nash equilibrium (PSNE) in nondecreasing strategies exists in games of incomplete information where an individual player's strategy ( ) i χ ⋅ is nondecreasing in her type, whenever all of her opponents use nondecreasing strategies. 22 Let
→ be the joint density over types (with respect to Lebesgue measure), assumed strictly positive on T, and let ( | )
be the conditional density of player i's opponents' types. Let player i's utility be given by :
. The following result gives necessary and sufficient conditions for each player's best response to nondecreasing strategies to be nondecreasing. ; @ is nondecreasing (strong set order) in x 1 when χj is nondecreasing.
Proposition 1 The following two conditions are equivalent: (i) for all i, ( )
Then, by Lemma 3, expected payoffs must be log-spm when the density is log-spm.
Comparative Statics with Single-Crossing Primitives
This section studies single crossing properties in problems where there is a single real-valued random variable. Multivariate generalizations of the results are sufficiently restrictive that they are not considered here. However, many problems in the theory of investment under uncertainty concern a single random variable, and a number of other problems (such as auctions) can be reformulated so that the techniques from this section apply.
Formally, in this section we assume that S ⊆ , and for simplicity we also assume that
. Although the results of Section 2 apply to this problem, in this section we seek to relax the assumption that both primitives are log-spm.
In particular, we consider the weaker assumption that u(x,s) satisfies SC2 in (x;s). Our comparative statics question becomes to find conditions on u and f under which * ( , ) arg max ( , )
23 Demand functions which satisfy these criteria include logit, CES, transcendental logarithmic, and a set of linear demand functions (see Milgrom and Roberts (1990b) and Topkis (1979) ).
Theorem 1 gives some initial insight into this problem: since the set of SC2 functions includes the set of log-spm functions, Theorem 1 implies that a necessary condition for (MCS′) to hold for all u which are SC2 is that f is log-spm. a.e.-µ. However, we have not established that u SC2 and f log-spm are sufficient for (MCS′), nor have we addressed the question of what conditions on u are necessary for the conclusion that (MCS′) holds for all f log-spm.
Before proceeding, we introduce a definition that will allow us to state concisely the theorems in this section. The definition helps to state theorems about pairs of hypotheses about u and f which guarantee a monotone comparative statics conclusion.
Definition 4 Two hypotheses H-A and H-B are a minimal pair of sufficient conditions (MPSC) for the conclusion C if: (i) C holds whenever H-B does, if and only if H-A holds. (ii) C holds whenever H-A does, if and only if H-B holds.
This definition captures the idea that we are looking for a pair of sufficient conditions that cannot be weakened without placing further structure on the problem. In some contexts, H-A will be given (such as an assumption on u), and we will search for the weakest hypothesis H-B (such as an assumption on f) that preserves the conclusion; in other problems, the roles of H-A and H-B
will be reversed. The definition can be used to state this section's main comparative statics result:
Theorem 2 (Comparative Statics with Single Crossing Payoffs) (A) u satisfies SC2 in (x;s) a.e.-µ. and (B) f is log-spm a.e.-µ; are a MPSC for (C) (MSC′) holds. 24
Theorem 2 has an interesting interpretation. Recall that SC2 of u(x,s) (condition T2-A) is the necessary and sufficient condition for the choice of x which maximizes u(x,s) (under certainty) to be nondecreasing in s. Thus, Theorem 2 gives necessary and sufficient conditions for the preservation of comparative statics results under uncertainty. 25 Any result that holds when s is known, will hold when s is unknown but the distribution of s experiences an MLR shift. Further, MLR shifts are the weakest distributional shifts that guarantee that conclusion. In Section 4, we illustrate in applications how additional commonly encountered restrictions on u or f can be used to relax (T2-A) and (T2-B).
We outline the proof of Theorem 2 in the text. Our first step is to transform the problem by taking the first difference with respect to x. In particular, U(x,θ) and u(x,s) satisfy SC2 (in (x;θ) and (x;s)) if and
(in θ and s). The following lemma characterizes SC1 for problems with a single random variable. 26 It is stated in more general notation because not only will we apply it in cases where u is a payoff function and f is a probability density, but we will also apply it to transformed objective functions (where for example, f is a probability distribution) as well as in problems where the agent's choice variable affects the probability distribution directly. where g crosses zero,
26 The theory of the preservation of single crossing properties under uncertainty has been studied by a number of authors in the statistics literature. Karlin and Rubin (1956) establish sufficiency, and Karlin (1968) (pp. 233-237) analyzes necessary conditions, under some additional regularity conditions (including the assumption that Θ has at least three points; Karlin's proof is designed to solve a more complicated problem and thus requires an elaborate construction). In Extension (ii), we relax Karlin's maintained assumptions about absolute continuity. When K is a probability distribution, the maintained absolute continuity assumption may be undesirable; however, if k represents a utility function, it is the right assumption. 27 We will say that g(s) satisfies SC1 almost everywhere-µ (a.e. The second equality holds because g satisfies SC1, while the inequality follows from (4.1). 
Then Lemma 5 holds if, for any β>0, (L5-A) is replaced with (L5-A') g∈*(β); Lemma 5 also holds if (L5-B) is replaced with (L5-B') k∈.(β).
As in Lemma 4, placing smoothness assumptions on g or k will not change the conclusions of Lemmas 5 and 6, but monotonicity or curvature assumptions will. 
Applications
The Choice of Distribution and Changes in Risk Preferences
This section considers investment problems where the agent chooses the probability distribution directly, from a parameterized family of distributions. For example, the agent chooses effort in a principal-agent problem, or makes an investment decision. The exogenous parameter (θ) describes risk preferences. We seek a MPSC for the conclusion that investment increases when risk preferences change. For this purpose, Lemma 5 provides succinct proofs of This result provides necessary and sufficient conditions for comparative statics in a range of applications. Consider each of (i)-(iii) in turn. 31 Case (i) might apply if a principal offers a mechanism to an agent where the allocation that will be received is stochastic. 32 The payoff u is log-spm when higher types have a larger relative return to s. When the support of s is fixed, weak SC2 of a probability density is stronger than FOSD but weaker than MLR. In (ii), hypothesis (A) requires that the agent's Arrow-Pratt risk aversion is nondecreasing in θ. Further, (B) requires H(s;x H ) crosses H(s;x L ) at most once, from below, as a function of s. Under this assumption, it is possible that increasing x decreases the mean as well as the riskiness of the distribution; that is, it might incorporate a mean-risk tradeoff. In case (iii), the agents are restricted to be risk averse.
29 This is an example where it is useful to have results that do not rely on concavity of the objective: concavity of the objective in x requires additional assumptions (see Jewitt (1988a) and Athey (1998) ), which may or may not be reasonable in a given application. 30 Of these results, only (ii) has received attention in the literature. Diamond and Stiglitz (1974) established the sufficiency side of the relationship, and many authors have since exploited and further studied the result (such as Jewitt (1987 Jewitt ( , 1989 ). Jewitt (1987) shows that (A) is necessary and sufficient for (C) to hold whenever (B) does. 31 In each of (i)-(iii), the fact that (B) is necessary for the conclusion to hold whenever (A) holds relies crucially on the non-monotonicity of the relevant function in (A). Thus, while the sufficient conditions and the necessity of (A) in each case are quite general, one should be more careful in drawing conclusions about the necessity of (B). 32 Such uncertainty might arise if the principal cannot observe the agent's choice perfectly, or if the principal must design an error-prone bureaucratic system to carry out the regulation.
We see that x always increases with an agent's prudence (as defined in Section 3. 
How Much to Invest in a Risky Project
This subsection considers two classic problems, the portfolio investment problem and the decision problem of a risk averse firm. We generalize several comparative statics results previously established only for special functional forms.
Consider first the standard portfolio problem, where an agent with initial wealth w invests x in a risky asset with return s, and invests the remainder (w−x) in a risk-free asset with return r. Thus, the agent's payoff can be written u w x r sx ( Notice that s−r satisfies single crossing, and so long as the utility function is nondecreasing, we can apply Lemma 5 to this problem. In this problem, the crossing point is fixed at s=r for all choices of x: thus, in applying (4.2), we could actually weaken the restriction that f is log-spm. In particular, we could assume that the likelihood ratio,
l(s), is less than l(r) for s<r, and greater than l(r) for s>r. That is, l(s)−l(r) satisfies weak SC1(r).
On the other hand, if we wish to obtain comparative statics results that hold for all risk-free rates, r, then it will be necessary that l(s) is log-spm.
While the portfolio problem has been widely studied, far fewer results have been obtained for more general investment problems, where potentially risk-averse firms invest in a risky projects π(x,s), or make pricing or quantity decisions under uncertainty about demand. Suppose that an agent's objective is as follows: max x∈B ( ( , )) ( ; ) ( ) u x s f s d s π θ µ ∫ , and the solution set is denoted x * (θ,B). Thus, π represents a general return function which depends on the investment amount, x, and the state of the world, s. Notice that in this problem, the crossing point of x π is not the same for all x (as it will be in the portfolio problem).
When this objective function is differentiable, it suffices to check that the marginal returns to x, denoted ( ( , )) ( , ) ( ; ) ( ) 
Assume that u(y,θ) is
33 This result generalizes the existing investment literature in several ways. This literature typically considers the problem where the objective is differentiable and strictly quasi-concave. Landsberger and Meilijson (1990) show that the MLR is sufficient for comparative statics in the portfolio problem, and Ormiston and Schlee (1993) show that general comparative statics results are preserved by the MLR. A few papers consider comparative statics when π(x,s) = h(x)⋅s, as in Sandmo's (1971) classic model of a firm facing demand uncertainty. Milgrom (1994) shows that comparative statics results derived for the portfolio problem also hold for Sandmo's model. Proposition 2 highlights the critical role played by the assumption that π satisfies SC2, but not multiplicative separability, extending the existing results to more general models of firm objectives. 
MPSC for the conclusion (C) x*(θ,B) is nondecreasing in θ and B.
Hypothesis (B) is satisfied if (i) θ decreases the investor's absolute risk aversion, and (ii) θ generates an MLR shift in F. Thus, this result provides a generalization of two basic results in the theory of investment under uncertainty, illustrating that log-supermodularity links the seemingly unrelated conditions on the distribution and the investor's risk aversion.
Incorporating Additional Structure on Primitives
Many economic primitives have more structure than a single crossing property. One particular kind of structure that arises in auction games and investment problems is that the incremental return function g(s) is quasi-concave in s. For example, in a portfolio problem, the marginal returns to investment are quasi-concave if the agent is risk averse and the coefficient of relative risk aversion is greater than 1.
Notice that quasi-concavity of g restriction prevents us from constructing the counterexamples of Lemma 5: the test function illustrated in Figure 1 is clearly not quasi-concave.
Theorem 2 can then be extended, as follows: By Lemma 2 (and recalling the discussion in Section 2), log-spm of K (corresponding to the Monotone Probability Ratio Order) is weaker than log-spm of k (corresponding to MLR). To understand the difference between the two orders, observe that the Monotone Probability Ratio
Theorem 3 For each θ ∈ Θ , let K(⋅;θ) be a probability distribution on S. Then (C) (MCS′) holds for all sets B whenever (A) u satisfies SC2 in (x
Order (MPR) requires that θ increases the weight on s relative to the aggregate of all states s′<s, while the MLR requires that θ increases the weight on s relative to every individual state s′<s. 37 One consequence is that the MPR is more robust to perturbations.
Necessity of (T3-B) can be established using the test functions approach: 38 37 Another way to describe the difference is that the MLR requires that a distribution be ordered by First Order Stochastic Dominance conditional on every two-point set, while the MPR requires a distribution to be ordered by First Order Stochastic Dominance conditional on every interval (−∞,s] (the latter result is established in the working paper (Athey, 1997) 
Then Theorem 3 holds if, for any β>0, (T3-A) is replaced with (T3-
A') for all H L x x > , ( , ) ( , ) ( ) H L u x u x g ⋅ − ⋅ = ⋅ ∈*(β).
Application: Mineral Rights Auction with Asymmetries and Risk Aversion
This section studies Milgrom and Weber's (1982) When player two uses the bidding function 2 ( ) β ⋅ , then the set of best reply bids for player one given her signal (s 1 ) can be written (assuming ties are broken randomly):
as a probability distribution, K is restricted to be monotone. This restriction prevents us from constructing the requisite counter-examples. It can, however, be established that g cannot be decreasing and then increasing at the upper end of the support; more generally, any violations of quasi-concavity must not be too severe relative to the magnitude of the function. 39 As in the pricing game studied in Section 2, this is not a game with strategic complementarities between players bidding functions, so Vives (1990) may not be applied to establish existence of a PSNE. 
s g(s)
Figure 2: A test function for the set of single-crossing, quasi-concave functions. 
Athey (forthcoming) applies this result to show that in auction games such as the first price auction described above, a PSNE exists. 41
Single Crossing of Indifference Curves
The Spence-Mirrlees single crossing property (SM) is central to the analysis of monotonicity in standard signaling and screening games, as well as many other mechanism design problems.
For an arbitrary differentiable function
When the (x,y) indifference curves are well defined, (SM) is equivalent to the requirement that the indifference curves cross at most once as a function of t. We will make use the following assumption which guarantees that the (x,y)-indifference curves are well-behaved: 42
41 What happens when we try to extend this model to I≥2 bidders? If the bidders face a symmetric distribution, and all opponents use the same symmetric bidding function, then only the maximum signal of all of the opponents will be relevant to bidder one. Define M s = max 2 ( ,.., ) I s s . Milgrom and Weber (1982) show that 1 ( , ) M s s are affiliated when the distribution is exchangeable. Further, if the opponents are using the same strategies, whichever opponent has the highest signal will necessarily have the highest bid. Then we can apply Proposition 4 to this problem exactly as if there were only two bidders. Unfortunately, this approach does not extend directly to n-bidder, asymmetric auctions with common value elements. Under asymmetric distributions (or if players use asymmetric strategies), affiliation of the signals is not sufficient to guarantee that the signal of the highest bidder is affiliated with a given player's signal, nor is it sufficient to guarantee log-supermodularity of the conditional distribution. 42 It is also possible to generalize SM to the case where h is not differentiable, but we maintain (WB) for simplicity. (x,y,s) satisfies (SM) a.e.-µ, and (B) f is log-spm in (s;θ) a.e.-µ, are a MPSC for (C) ( , , ) V x y θ satisfies (SM).
Theorem 4 (Comparative Statics and the Spence-Mirrlees SCP) Lemma 8 also holds if (L8-C) is replaced with (C)
* ( , ) arg max ( , ( ), )
is nondecreasing in θ and B for all
Sufficiency in Lemma 8 can be shown using Lemma 2. Let:
, and note that (T5-A) and
This in turn implies by Lemma 2 that
Applications to Signaling Games and Savings Problems
Theorem 4 can be applied to an education signaling model, where x represents a worker's choice of education, y is monetary income, and θ is a noisy signal of the worker's ability, s (for example, the workers' experience in previous schooling). If the worker's preferences u (x,y,s) satisfy (SM) and higher signals increase the likelihood of high ability, the worker's education choice will be nondecreasing in the signal θ for any wage function w(x).
In another example, consider a consumption-savings problem. Let x denote savings and b(⋅) the value function of savings. The agent has an endowment (θ) of a risky asset (s). The probability distribution over asset returns is given by F(⋅;θ). The agent's utility given a realization of s is u z s x b x ( , ( )) + − , which is assumed to be nondecreasing. The agent solves max ( , ( )) ( ; ) 
Conclusions
This paper studies conditions for comparative statics predictions in stochastic problems, and shows how they apply to economic problems. The main theorems are summarized in Table 1 .
The properties of primitives considered in this paper, the various single crossing properties and log-supermodularity, are each necessary and sufficient for comparative statics in an appropriately defined class of problems. Several variations of these results are analyzed, each of which exploits additional structure that can arise in economic problems. Because the properties studied in this paper, and the corresponding comparative statics predictions, do not rely on differentiability or concavity, the results from this paper can be applied in a wider variety of economic contexts than similar results from the existing literature.
This paper builds on results from the statistics literature to establish sufficient conditions for comparative statics. We further provides new results about necessity, while highlighting the limitations of these results. Table 1 summarizes the tradeoffs that must occur between weakening and strengthening assumptions about various components of economic models. Together with Athey (1998)'s analysis of stochastic supermodularity, concavity, and other differential properties, the results in this paper can be used to identify which assumptions are the appropriate ones to guarantee robust monotone comparative statics predictions in a wide variety of stochastic problems in economics. u(x,s)≥0 is logspm.
arg max 
Appendix
Definition A1 Proof of Lemma 1: If U is log-spm in (x,θ), then it must be quasi-spm, which Milgrom and Shannon (1994) show implies the comparative statics conclusion. Now suppose that U fails to be log-spm in (x,θ) for some u. For simplicity, consider the case where n=2, and start with the case where U>0. Then, there exists an 1
and H L θ θ ≥ , with one of the weak inequalities holding strictly, such that
, violating the requirement that (a) V is quasi-spm in x and (b) V satisfies SC2 in (x;θ). Now, return to the case where we might have U(x,θ)=0 for some (x,θ). Note that since U≥0, logspm of U can fail in the example above only if
U x x θ >0, the argument above is unchanged. Now suppose 
, another violation of Milgrom and Shannon's (1994) necessary and sufficient conditions for comparative statics. Proof of Lemma 4: Sufficiency follows from Lemma 2. Necessity is treated in two main cases, with other cases following in a similar manner:
. Pick any two intervals of length ε, ( )
. Taking the limit as 0 ε → , standard limiting arguments (e.g. Martingale convergence theorem) imply that f must be log-spm in (s,θ) almost everywhere-µ.
(2) n,m≥2: 
T for all θ,θ′. Since this must hold for all t and for all a,b, we can use the Martingale convergence theorem to conclude that ( ; ) ( ; ) ( ; ) ( ; )
Proof of Proposition 1: Sufficiency follows from Lemma 2 and Milgrom and Shannon (1994) . Following the proof of Theorem 1, it is possible to show that U i (x i ,t i ) is log-supermodular for all u i (x i ,t) log-supermodular, only if, for all t t
But, since for a positive function, log-spm can be checked pairwise, this condition holds for all i if and only if h is log-spm. Apply Lemma 1. 
Now, define a modified likelihood ratio l (s), as follows: 
Proof of Lemma
It is straightforward to verify that there exists a δ>0 such that the single crossing property fails with this g. But this implies that for any ε positive and in the relevant range, (x,b(x) ,s) fails SC2 in (x;s). But then, Theorem 2 implies that there exists an f(s;θ) which is log-spm a.e.-µ such that ∫v(x,b(x),s)f(s;θ)dµ(s) fails SC2 in (x;θ). We conclude that ∫v(x,y,s)f(s;θ)dµ(s) fails (SM).
